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INTRODUCTION

Not long ago, banks worried merely about the default of borrowers
in financial distress. Today, a grave new concern faces banks - the
possibility borrowers will file suit against the bank and win under the
new doctrine of lender liability. Under this doctrine, liability may
*This note is dedicated to my parents, Mr. & Mrs. Marshall R. Cassedy, in appreciation for
making law school possible for me.
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exceed the loan amount and is compounded by legal fees and use of
valuable time necessary to defend the lawsuit., Multimillion dollar jury
verdicts awarded against lenders have shaken the foundations of the
banking industry. 2 Bankers have now joined the ranks of those
targeted for malpractice suits.3
Borrowers most often initiate lender liability suits following commercial loan defaults. Theories for liability include interference with
corporate governance, 4 fraud,5 duress,6 misrepresentation, 7 negli-

1. Lenders often face judgments exceeding the loan amount when punitive damages are
awarded. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (a $7.5 million
judgment was awarded against the lender with $6 million awarded as punitive damages). Id.
at 759; State Natl Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (the borrower
received a $18,647,243.77 judgment against lender); LeMaire v. MBank Abilene, No. 52,567
(Dist. Ct. of Fort Bend County, 240th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 12, 1986) (borrower received
a judgment of nearly $70 million for lender's failure to fund a $3 million loan commitment) (cited
in Tyler, Emerging Theoriesof Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L. REv. 411, 412 n.2 (1987)).
2. Swartz, Lender Liability, U.S. BANKER, May 1986, at 10.
3. A recent Florida case has added maladministration to the string of theories levered
against lenders. See Does Lender Liability Now Include Banker Malpractice?, U.S. BANKER,
May 1986, at 26. In this case between Atrio Consolidated Industries and Southeast Bank of
Miami, the judge asked the jury whether the bank owed the borrower any duty of care beyond
the written loan agreements. Id. The jury responded positively by awarding the borrower $12
million ($9 million of which was punitive damages). Id. Before an appeal was pursued, the case
settled for a significant amount. Id.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 80-123.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 99-104.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 100-04.
7. Lenders that improperly induce other creditors to extend credit to a common debtor
have been held liable. See, e.g., Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d
1405 (6th Cir. 1984) (lender held liable for misrepresenting debtor's financial condition to one
of debtor's customers). The lender used the customer's subsequent payment to the debtor to
reduce the lender's loan rather than to construct the customer's machine. Id. at 1407. The court
held that once the lender answered, it had a duty to answer honestly. Id. at 1409. See also
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1985) (lender's
misleading careless response is actionable); Berldine Corp. v. Bank of Miss., 453 So. 2d 699
(Miss. 1984) (creditor allowed to recover on theories of fraud and negligent misrepresentation
for a bank's material misrepresentations concerning a customer's creditworthiness); Herbert,
Truth or Consequences?A Bank's Liabilityfor ErroneousAssurances Concerning a Customes
Account, 6 ANN. REV. OF BANKING L. 95 (1987).
Misrepresentations to third parties made to induce investments may be actionable under
securities laws. See First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1977) (jury could
find that bank had a duty to disclose subsequent discoveries of gross inaccuracies in company
books), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); United States Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund v.
Orenstein, 557 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1977). Further, a lender's course of conduct which induces a
third party to supply goods on credit can lead to lender liability for the cost of the goods. See
Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. Creole Supply, 596 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1979).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss1/5

2

Cassedy: The Doctrine of Lender Liability
DOCTRINE OF LENDER LIABILITY

gence,8 and breach of good faith.9 Borrowers also assert claims based

However, courts have imposed a general duty of confidentiality on banks precluding them
from divulging information concerning customer accounts. United States v. First Nat'l Bank,
67 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588,
367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961); Denson State Bank v. Maderirci, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982).
Hence, a lender's disclosure about a borrower can lead to a borrower suit for breach of confidentiality. Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 92 Misc. 2d 764, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 717 (1978). While this
general obligation of confidentiality was recognized in Florida in Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank,
224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969), it was qualified by the Florida Supreme Court in Barnett
Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
In Barnett Bank, Hooper began banking with Barnett Bank in 1973. Id. at 924. In 1981,
Hooper met with Hosner, an attorney and a Barnett Bank customer, to discuss tax shelters.
Id. Hosner took Hooper to meet with a bank officer, Riffel, who was in charge of Hosner's
accounts. Id. Riffel told Hooper that Hosner Investments was financially sound and had passed
the scrutiny of the Internal Revenue Service. Id. Hooper then borrowed $50,000 from the bank
to invest with Hosner. Id. On May 13, 1982, the bank suspected Hosner of a check kiting
scheme and returned all of Hosner's checks to protect the bank. Id. Riffel was aware of Hosner's
suspected scheme. On May 14, Hosner and Hooper contacted Riffel. Hooper requested a $90,000
loan to invest further with Hosner Investments. Id. Riffel arranged the loan. By May 24, the
check kiting scheme was confirmed, but because of Hooper's last investment the bank did not
suffer a loss.
Hooper sought to cancel the promissory note on the basis that he and the bank had developed
a confidential relationship requiring the bank to disclose facts material to the loan transaction.
Id. While the Florida Supreme Court recognized the bank's general duty of confidentiality to
its customers, the court found banks may have a duty to disclose under special circumstances.
Id. at 925. The supreme court held that when a bank becomes involved in a transaction with
a customer with whom the bank has established a relationship of trust, and the bank is likely
to benefit from the transaction at the customer's expense, the bank may have a duty to disclose
material facts about the transaction otherwise unavailable to the customer. Id. Hence, the jury
could have found the bank had established a fiduciary relationship with Hooper and owed him
a duty to disclose the check kiting scheme. Id. at 926. The jury was entitled to weigh the bank's
duty of disclosure to Hooper against its duty of confidentiality to Hosner. Id. The court reversed
the summary judgment in the bank's favor and remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
The Barnett Bank case seems to fall in line with an emerging trend to disclose facts when
failure to do so would be harmful. See Beneficial Commercial Corp. v. Murray Glick Datsun,
Inc., 601 F. Supp. 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
8. Negligence can be used to allege lender misconduct at various stages of the lending
transaction. For cases asserting liability for negligence in processing a loan, see First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1980); Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27,
161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980); Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 62 Md. App. 54, 488 A.2d 210 (1985),
rev'd, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986). For cases asserting liability for negligence in loan administration,
see Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Columbia
Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For cases asserting liability
for reckless disregard of borrower's rights over a long period, see Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 688 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1984).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 135-93.
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on federal statutes under securities laws,10
environmental laws," tax
4

laws,' bankruptcy laws,3 and RICO.

10. A lender may be found to control the debtor to the extent that the lender is secondarily
liable for violating federal securities laws. Section 20(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982) is the basis for a lender's secondary liability for security violations.
For further information, see Douglas-Hamilton, CreditorLiabilities Resulting from Improper
Interference with the Management of a FinanciallyTroubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343, 352-63
(1975); Flick & Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections, 103
BANKING L.J. 220, 228-32 (1986); Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship
with Its Debtor, 27 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 1 (1985).
11. Environmental laws may assess clean-up costs against a lender if hazardous or toxic
materials are discovered on mortgaged premises. This liability is based on the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57
(1986). See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United
States v. Mirable, No. 84-2280, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985); see also Burcat, Environmental
Liability of Creditors:Open Season on Banks, Creditorsand OtherDeep Pockets, 103 BANKING
L.J. 509 (1986); Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditorsunder Superfund, PRAc. LAw.,
Mar. 1987, at 13 (forms included); Schwenke, Lender Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Expenses, 1 PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 43.

12. Under 26 U.S.C. §§ 3505, 6672 (1986), a lender may be held responsible for unpaid
taxes. See United States v. McMullen, 516 F.2d 917 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 915 (1975);
Dallas v. United States, 68-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9290 (Feb. 14, 1968).
13. Finding a creditor controlled a debtor can result in the creditor being classified as an
"insider" of the debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)(B)(iii), (V) (1986). If
the creditor is classified as an insider, the preference period is extended from 90 days to one
year during which payments to the creditor may be challenged. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1986).
See Note, The Term Insider Within Section 547(b)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 NOTRE
DAmE LAW. 726 (1982). An insider's vote for or against a reorganization plan may not be
counted in determining a class' acceptance or rejection of a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1986).
Finally, this insider status resulting from excessive control may result in the subordination of
the creditor's claim through the doctrine of equitable subordination. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1986).
The Bankruptcy Code expressly recognizes equitable subordination. However, no guidelines
are set forth for its application, leaving this matter to case law. See DeNatale & Abram, The
Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAw.
417 (1985). See also Chaitman, The Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus. LAW.
1561 (1984). The mere ability to exercise control is not sufficient for subordination. The claimant
must have exercised the control which results in actual injury to another. Comstock v. Group
of Institutional Lenders, 335 U.S. 211 (1948); Wood v. Richmond, 536 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1976);
In re Prima, 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938); In re Osborne, 42 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. W.D. 1984);
DeNatale & Abram, supra at 432-34.
14. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-65 (1986), a claimant may recover treble damages. This makes the statute extremely
attractive to potential plaintiffs and should provide stimulus for lenders to assiduously avoid
conduct exposing them to liability under RICO. For cases where the court has allowed a borrower
to proceed with a RICO claim alleging interest overcharges, see Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984); Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank, 703 F.2d 1220 (lth
Cir. 1983); Wilcutts v. Jefferson Trust & Sav. Bank, Civ. No. 82-1153 (C.D. Il1. Apr. 21, 1982);
Mooney v. Fidelity Union Bank, Civ. No. 82-3192 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1983); Coastal Steel Corp.
v. Chemical Bank, Civ. No. 82-1714 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 1982); Shaw v. Oregon Bank, Civ. No.
82-126 (B.E. Ore. May 17, 1982).
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Borrowers facing financial difficulty often feel at the lender's mercy.
Fearing the loan will be called and subsequent insolvency will ensue,
15
borrowers feel they lack leverage to control an overreaching creditor.
Today, the balance of power is shifting. Borrowers are fighting back
and winning. 16 Lenders, however, are in a dilemma. 17 They may face
harsh consequences if they do not help a financially troubled debtor,
and a strong potential for liability if they do.' 8 Lenders can avoid this
situation, however, if they understand the parameters of proper lender
conduct.
One ramification of the new wave in lender liability is a restructuring of traditional banking practices. New standards for proper lender
conduct are being set. This emerging body of law requires careful
examination not only by lenders wishing to avoid such liability, but
also by borrowers wishing to ensure their rights are properly protected.
Two areas dominate lender liability: liability for excessive control
and for breach of good faith. This note will analyze the theories in
these major areas and pinpoint theories most suitable to redress lender
misconduct. This note will then examine the role played by creditors
in the actual operation of the credit market, to explore limits which
should be placed on lender liability. Finally, the note will highlight
reasonable standards of conduct bankers should adopt to avoid liability.
II.

CONTROL LIABILITY

Potential for liability frequently arises when the lender interferes
with or exerts some control over the debtor, typically over the debtor's
business operations. 9 A lender may assert control to prevent the
debtor from going bankrupt or to salvage as much of the loan as
possible in the event of the debtor's insolvency. 2° Even in the absence
of financial erosion, a lender often will exert some control over the

15. To remedy this situation, courts often impose a duty of good faith on the lender. See

infra text accompanying notes 192-211. For example, in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985), the court found the failure to imply a duty of good faith on the lender
would make the contract unreasonable, and put the borrower at the lender's mercy. Id. at 759.
16. Moss, Borrowers Fight Back With Lender Liability, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1987, at 64.
17. Swartz, supra note 2, at 15.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(lender liable for excessive control over management of borrower's business).
20. See, e.g., Melamned v. Lake County Natl Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1404 (6th Cir. 1984)
(lender held liable for tortious interference with the debtor's operations to salvage whatever
possible).
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debtor to monitor collateral and to protect the lender's interests.21
The rationale behind imposing liability for excessive control is that
the controlling creditor benefits from the exertion of control at the
expense of the debtor or junior creditors.2
Control may be manifested in various ways. A lender may obtain
voting control,2 participate on the debtor's board of directors,2 gain
control of management,2 exert financial control, 26 or interfere with

21. A lender which monitors collateral or the debtor's operations focuses on preventing
debtor misconduct. For instance, a debtor may misbehave by changing investment policies or
business projects which increase the variability of the firm's assets. The debtor may also convert
business assets to private use or dilute the creditor's claim by issuing additional risky debt.
Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 919-22 (1986).
Instead of monitoring the debtor, the lender often inserts convenants or restrictions forbidding
debtor misconduct. These contractual substitutes, together with leverage provided by a security
interest in the debtor's collateral, may give rise to liability for latent control. Id. at 935. However,
courts differ as to whether control must be exercised to create liability. For instance, a split
in authority exists as to whether, under § 20(a) of the Securities Eichange Act of 1934, mere
power to control is sufficient to impose liability or whether actual control must be exercised.
For cases holding that mere potential for control is sufficient, see Savino v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiff must only allege a position of control
to state a claim under § 20(a)); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 892 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (control depends upon whether the defendant had the power or potential power to exert
influence), affd, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Harriman v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101 (D. Del. 1974). See also Gilbertville Trucking
Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115 (1962) (under the Interstate Commerce Act, control does
not have to be actually exercised). For more discussion on the contents of loan agreements, see
Nassberg, Loan Documentation:Basic but Crucial,36 Bus. LAW. 843 (1981); Simpson, Structuring and Documenting Business Financing TransactionsUnder the FederalBankruptcy Code
of 1978, 35 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1980); Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrowers
Viewpoint, 28 Bus. LAW. 1161 (1973).
22. Schechter, The PrincipalPrinciple:Controlling Creditors Should Be Held for Their
Debtor's Obligations, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 882-84 (1986); Tyler, Emerging Theories of
Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L. REV. 411, 434 (1987).
23. Power to vote corporate stock means a lender may have substantial influence in electing
the board of directors. This can be interpreted as control over the company. Commentators
suggest lenders should shun voting power to avoid the slightest appearance of impropriety. D.
ROME, BUSINESS WORKOUTS MANUAL
8.03, at 8-9, 8-10 (1985).
24. This occurs where a director serves simultaneously on the boards of both the lender
and borrower. For a general discussion of interlocking directorships, see id. at 8-11 to 8-12.
25. Through contractual loan provisions, a lender may gain veto power or otherwise control
day-to-day management of the debtor's operations. For an example where this led to liability,
see State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
26. Financial control occurs when a lender obtains control over the debtor's finances sufficient to enable lender to determine economic viability of the business. The lender may regulate
the debtor's cash flow or dictate financial judgments. See D. ROME, supra note 23, at 8-13 to -14.
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the borrower's other contractual relationships.- Excessive control may
result in subordination of the lender's claim to general creditor status
because of equitable subordination,2 liability to the debtor's creditors

or other third parties,2 or liability to the debtor for lost profits.30
A.

Development of Control Liability

As a developing area of the law, the doctrine of lender liability
lacks historical foundation. Although common law recognized the present theories used to impose liability, these theories only recently
have been applied to the lending industry. The few early cases which

sought to impose liability on a lender for exerting control over the
borrower's operations were largely unsuccessful.3' Borrowers were
unsuccessful perhaps due to inadequate representation and the use of
32
theories not well adapted for application to the lending industry.

27. Petrich v. Nurseryland Garden Centers, Inc., 140 Cal. App. 3d 243 (1983). However,
if a lender is protecting a financial interest and the lender's conduct is not otherwise wrongful,
the conduct may be privileged. Del State Bank v. Solomon, 548 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (1979) states:
One who, having a financial interest in the business of a third person, intentionally
causes that person not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another,
does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if he (a) does not employ
wrongful means and (b) acts to protect his interest from being prejudiced by the
relation.
28. See supra note 13.
29. See Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th
Cir. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974); A. Gay Jenson Farms v. Cargill, Inc., 309
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.
1984). Liability to other third parties generally occurs where the lender's interference with the
debtor's operations has resulted in termination or debtor's breach of contract with a third party.
See Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984).
30. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
31. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916); American
S. Trust Co. v. McKee, 173 Ark. 147, 293 S.W. 50 (1927).
32. Presumably, financially troubled debtors typically could not afford adequate counsel.
Lenders, on the other hand, occupied a better financial position and were probably more
adequately represented. The asserted theories often were not easily adapted to the lender-borrower relationship and were difficult to prove. For example, the instrumentality theory borrowed
from corporate law imposes a stringent standard of complete domination to impose liability. See
infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text for an explanation of why this theory is not easily
adapted to the lender-borrower relationship.
An early case demonstrating the difficulty of proving a lender's liability under the instrumentality theory is Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916). In
ChicagoMill, a junior unsecured creditor proceeded against the senior bank creditor. The junior
creditor sought payment for an obligation owed by the common debtor, a mill company. The
bank, after becoming dissatisfied with the mill's operation, arranged to have its assistant cashier
elected as the mill's president. Id. at 43-44. The bank also chose a new general manager. Id.
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Today, the situation has changed. Sophisticated lawyers are aggres-

sively representing borrowers' interests, offering ingenuity in the use
of traditional theories.

To develop the lender liability doctrine, borrowers have innovatively adapted a myriad of traditional theories for the lending industry. 3 Some theories are better suited than others to curb lender misconduct. 4 These theories each impose liability depending on the degree
of control over or interference with the borrower. The theories range

from liability for the mere potential to exert control, to theories such
as instrumentality which require a lender's complete domination of
7
the borrower. Lender liability is a constantly evolving body of law.
No concrete rules have been set, so lenders can only learn from others'
mistakes. This problem requires a close factual analysis of the major
cases under each theory. The following discussion examines the control

liability theories and the amount of control a plaintiff must prove
under each to impose liability.

The new president conferred regularly with the bank president who gave substantial input
concerning the mill's operation. Id. at 44. The court found the evidence insufficient to establish
the bank controlled and managed the company. Id. at 46. Emphasizing that such conduct was
a legitimate and customary practice in overseeing a debtor, the court refused to impose liability.
Id.
Another early case exhibits a reluctance to impose liability on a lender under the agency
theory. In American S. Trust Co. v. McKee, 173 Ark. 147, 293 S.W. 50 (1927), two creditor
banks installed a manager in the debtor bank, who was contractually given complete authority
to grant loans and collect collateral. Id. at 150-52, 293 S.W. at 52. In fact, this manager exercised
substantial control over the debtor's operations. Id. at 155, 293 S.W. at 54. In dismissing
liability, the court held that the acts of the manager which were beyond the authority outlined
in the contract were not binding on the creditor banks. Id. at 162, 293 S.W. at 56.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.
34. The theories used to assert lender misconduct vary regarding the plaintiff's burden to
establish lender liability. For example, breach of good faith places a lesser burden on the plaintiff
to establish liability than the theories of breach of fiduciary duty or alter ego. Some theories
are not easily adapted to the lender-borrower relationship. For example, breach of fiduciary
duty or the instrumentality rule are not easily adapted to the lender-borrower relationship
because they require such a high degree of creditor involvement to establish liability. See infra
text accompanying notes 129-91.
35. Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968).
36. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.
1973), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. For example, while the theory of liability for failure to exert potential control has been
rejected, a recent case has added maladministration to the agenda of theories for asserting
lender liability. See supra note 3 and infra text accompanying notes 62-79.
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B.

Liability for Borrower's Negligence for Failure to
Exercise Potential Control

The California Supreme Court has imposed liability for the least
amount of control exercised over a borrower.38 The court found the
lender liable for not exercising any control. In Connorv. GreatWestern
Savings & Loan Association,39 the court recognized a duty to exercise
potential control. 40 In Connor, the lender financed an inexperienced
real estate developer's land acquisition. 41 The real estate developer
planned to construct a housing development on the land.4 The lender,
Great Western, and borrower agreed that the lender would have the
right of first refusal to make loans to the home buyers.4 Under the
agreement, if an approved buyer obtained financing elsewhere and
Great Western had offered the same loan terms, the real estate developer was required to pay Great Western the fees and interest

earned by the other lender.The bank made the construction loan terms more favorable by
failing to inquire into the faulty financial information received from

38. Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 866, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378. While reasonably the potential, but
unexercised control ought not give rise to liability because the creditor has gained no benefit
through the exercise of control, there is some authority that mere potential for control will
result in liability. See supranote 21. As discussed previously, the potential to control can result
in liability under securities laws. Id. However, other courts impose liability for the mere potential
to control, evidenced by covenants contained in loan agreements between the controlled and
controlling party. See, e.g., Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr.
728 (1967) (franchisor held liable as principal to the controlled franchisee). In finding liability,
the court stated that the agency relationship was established by the contract provisions which
gave the franchisor extensive control over the franchisee. Id. at 614-15, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32.
Accord Wickham v. Southland Corp., 168 Cal. App. 3d 49, 55-59, 213 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829-31
(1985). However, the favored view is that actual control must be exercised to establish liability.
See In re Prima, 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939); Christoffel v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978). Christoffel involved a suit against E.F. Hutton
for misappropriation of estate assets. The court stated that although the concept of control is
broad, it is not unlimited. Control requires some active participation by the controlling person
in affairs of the controlled. Id. at 668. See also Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 832-33
(9th Cir. 1984) (must have some showing of actual participation in the corporation's operations);
Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981); Metge v. Baehler, 577 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Iowa
1984) (evidence must show that lender was active participant in the corporation's operation),
nodified, 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1072 (1985).
41. Conner, 69 Cal. 2d at 858, 447 P.2d at 612, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
42.

Id.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 861, 447 P.2d at 614, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
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the developer and without following its normal procedure of reviewing
construction plans before committing to the loan. 45 Nor did the bank

G
examine the foundation plans or make construction recommendations.4
After the housing development was constructed, the foundations of
the homes began to crack causing serious damage. Because the foundations were improperly constructed they were unable to withstand
the soil expansion. 47 The home buyers sued Great Western since the
developer's financial resources were limited.
The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment
of nonsuit granted in the lender's favor. While the supreme court
found no joint venture existed8 and therefore no vicarious liability,
the court nevertheless found the lender owed a duty to the home
9
buyers to exercise reasonable care to prevent defective construction.4
In imposing this duty, the court determined Great Western had become more than a lender ° It had actively participated in the home
construction business with the authority to exert extensive control
over the business. 51 The court found the lender failed to reasonably
exercise this control because it had not required soil tests, examined

2
the foundations, or made suggestions to improve the building plans.,

The court also found public policy justified imposing this duty to
exercise control.5 The lender owed this duty primarily to its shareholders to protect the security for its long-term loans. The court, however, expanded this duty to find the lender had an even stronger
obligation to protect the home buyers.5 The court reasoned that the
typical home buyer was Mi-equipped to discern such defects and lacked
the financial capacity to remedy them.5
In dissent, Justice Mosk argued that imposing liability for failing
to exercise control existed only in the presence of a special relation-

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

860,
860,
856,
863,
866,
864,

447
447
447
447
447
447

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

at
at
at
at
at
at

613,
613,
611,
615,
617,
616,

73
73
73
73
73
73

Cal.
Cal.
Cal.
Cal.
Cal.
Cal.

Rptr.
Rptr.
Rptr.
Rptr.
Rptr.
Rptr.

at
at
at
at
at
at

373-74.
374.
371.
375.
378.
376.

at 867, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378.

54. Id.
55.

Id.

56.

Id. For further discussion of the obligation to control another's actions to protect third

parties, see Harper & Kime, Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 48 YALE L.J. 886 (1934)

(no mention of a creditor's duty to protect third parties from the debtor's misconduct); Note,
Failureto Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631 (1952).
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ship . 7 No authority supported imposing a duty on the lender to control
another's misconduct to prevent injury to third parties.5 Moreover,
the dissent contended the majority's finding that the lender had extensive control over the debtor was mythical 9 The lender merely had
the control to refuse to lend money. 60Justice Mosk found the majority
opinion implied that all lenders could be held to control the projects
61
they financed.

C.

The Future of Liability for Failure to
Exercise Potential Control

Interestingly, the Restatement of Torts does not recognize the
62
debtor-creditor relationship as one generating control responsibilities.
Generally, courts recognize such a relationship only when overriding
social policy concerns and some economic advantage to the controlling
party are present.s In Connor, the lender received a fixed fee. The
lender would not reap any reward had the project proved extremely
profitable. 4 On the other hand, the developer, while exposed to many
more risks and liabilities, could reap significant profits. The majority's
position in Connor, however, found the lender to assume additional
risks for which the lender received no corresponding reward. According to Justice Mosk, the majority drastically restructured traditional
economic relationships.
The Connor court's grounds for imposing liability on a control
theory were weak. While social policy justifications existed, the accompanying economic advantages to the controlling party did not.6 While
the lender received some additional economic benefits, these benefits
did not constitute profit sharing. Profit sharing would have justified

57.

69 Cal. 2d at 874, 447 P.2d at 622, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 382.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 875, 447 P.2d at 623, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316-319 (1977) (the relations between the
actor and a third person which require the actor to control the third person's conduct); id. §§
314A & 320 (the relations between the actor and another party which require the actor to
control the conduct of third persons to protect the other party include innkeeper-guest, employeremployee, and land owner-licensee). See generally Harper & Kime, supra note 56.
63. Harper & Kime, supra note 56, at 331.
64. 69 Cal. 2d at 873, 447 P.2d at 622, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
65. Id.
66. Although the profits of each were dependent on the overall success of the development,
neither was to share in the profits or the losses that the other might realize or suffer. See Note,
The Expanding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1969).
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imposing risks and liabilities commensurate with those of the developer. Instead, the Connor court's analysis seems based on equitable
principles and an evaluation of who is in a better position to bear the
costs.67 Since social and equity principles better justify the court's

holding the case is unlikely to significantly restructure the control
liability theory. In fact, the California Legislature subsequently
amended their Civil Code to limit the Connor holding.6 Consequently,
both California courts and most courts around the country have read
the case narrowly.69 Lenders are exposed to liability only if they share
in the profits earned by projects they financed. 70
A Florida case exemplifies the Connor holding's limitations. In
Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors,7I condominium purchasers asserted a claim against the construction lender similar to that in Connor.72 The Fourth District Court of Appeal dismissed the complaint
finding the mortgagee was not an active participant. 7 The court found
the loan agreement's supervisory provisions were inserted to protect
the lender and that a lender owed no duty to others to supervise
projects it financed. 74 Finally, the court expressly rejected a broad
interpretation of Connor.7s Despite privity between the lender and a

67. The Connor court's finding of a duty rests on the court's conclusion that the homeowner
did not occupy a position to protect against such defects. 69 Cal. 2d at 865-66, 447 P.2d at 617,
73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
68. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (West 1970) which provides in pertinent part that:
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used . . . to
finance the . . . improvement of real or personal property for sale or lease to
others, shall not be held liable to third persons for any loss or damage occasioned
by any defect in the real or personal property... unless such loss or damage is
a result of an act of the lender outside the scope of the activities of a lender of
money or unless the lender has been a party to misrepresentations with respect
to such real or personal property.
Id. For further analysis of the Connor case and liability of construction lenders, see Comment,
Indirect Liabilities of Construction Lenders in a Development Setting, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1525 (1979).
69. See, e.g., Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540 (4th D.C.A.), cert.
denied, 366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978). Liability has been limited to situations in which the creditor
partakes of the profits realized by the financial project. See Skerlec v. Wells Fargo Bank, 18
Cal. App. 3d 1003, 96 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1971); Flamingo Drift Fishing, Inc. v. Nix, 251 So. 2d
316 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971); Callaizakis v. Astor Dev. Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512
(1972). Cf. Blackwell v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 132 Colo. 45, 284 P.2d 1060 (1955).
70. See supra note 64.
71. 359 So. 2d 540 (4th D.C.A.), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1978).
72. 359 So. 2d at 542.
73. Id. at 543.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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purchaser, inspection provisions in the mortgage do not impose a duty
on the lender to ensure proper construction. 6 This in effect vitiates
the Connor holding.
Liability for failing to exercise control is not likely to expand given
the Restatement's position,77 and the California Legislature's7 and
other courts' 79 rejection of this liability theory. Arguably, courts have
abandoned failure to exercise control as a lender liability theory.
D.

Liability Theories for Exercising of Excessive Control

Excessive control over a borrower's businesses can result in lender
liability for fraud, duress, or interference. Liability can arise if a
lender excessively participates in any one particular aspect of a debtor's business.80 Liability may result if the lender is on the board of
directors, or participates in management or in the debtor's operations81 For instance, a court may hold a lender liable for profits lost
under a management over which the lender has control.2 Abuse of
the control can invoke claims of fraud or duress which carry a steep
price tag for punitive damages.8
State National Bank v. FarahManufacturing Co.4 is a recent
case illustrating the application of these theories and their staggering
costs. This case brought lender liability into the national spotlight
when a jury returned a $19 million verdict against a lender. In Farah,s
the borrower asserted claims for fraud, duress, and interference because of the lender's control over the debtor's board of directors and
management. The borrower succeeded on all three counts.
The controversy centered on a management change clause in a $22
million dollar loan agreement between the Farah Manufacturing Company (FMC) and the lenders.s The clause allowed the lender to call

76. Id.
77. See supra text accompanying note 62.
78. See supra text accompanying note 68.
79. See supra text accompanying note 69.
80. See D. RoME, supra note 23, at 8-10 to 8-13; Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 10.
81. Id.
82. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
83. See In re Process Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964); State Nat'l Bank
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). Liability for excessive control differs
from the agency and instrumentality theories in that more pervasive control is required under
the agency or instrumentality theories.
84. The damage award in Farahof $18,947,348.77 challenged on appeal was affirmed with
a reduction of $300,000. Farah,678 S.W.2d at 667, 699.
85. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
86. Id. at 666-67.
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the loan if a change in management was considered contrary to the
lender's interests for any reason., The parties signed the loan agreement just after Farah had been ousted from his position as CEO and
president.'8 When company profits began to deteriorate, Farah sought
to regain his position as CEO."
The court based its decision on several factors. First, the lenders
gave the FMC board of directors the impression that the loan would
be called if Farah was reinstated as CEO.90 The lenders, in reality,
were undecided as to what they would do.91 Second, the lenders blocked
the election of two directors they felt Farah could control.92 Third,
many members elected to the board of directors, and the individual
ultimately selected as CEO, had strong loyalties to FMC lenders.9
For example, the lender previously employed the chairman of the
board of directors. 4 Additionally, the CEO and another director served
on the lender's board. 95 Fourth, when FMC continued to lose money,
the lender requested FMC hire a specific consultant. This consultant
was then elected CEO." The consultant subsequently auctioned some
FMC machinery and the proceeds were used to prepay FMC's debts
to the lender.Y Finally, the FMC board reinstated Farah as CEO and
the company returned to profitability."
The debtor based its cause of action for fraud on the lender's
misrepresentation that it would call the loan if FMC reinstated Farah
when the lender was unsure of its course of action." FMC also based
its duress claim on the lender's threat to foreclose on the loan if Farah
were reinstated. 1°° The court found the lender's warnings constituted
duress because they caused "Farah and other board members to do
what they would not have otherwise done."'' 1 Since the lender had
the power to injure FMC's business and property interests, the FMC

87.

Id. at 667.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 667-68.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 670-71, 686.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 688, 690.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 680.

100. Id. at 683.
101.

Id. at 686.
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board occupied a vulnerable position. The court held that forcing a
party to choose between undesirable and costly alternatives constitutes
duress. 1 2 For example, duress exists when a party must bow to a
lender's excessive demand or face bankruptcy, loss of credit rating,
or loss of profits from a venture.m The lender had no right to issue
such warnings when no evidence indicated that FMC's loan was in
1°4
default or prospect of repayment was impaired.
The debtor based the interference claim on the lender's actionp
which compelled the election of incompetent, inexperienced, and disloyal directors and officers.1°5 Significantly, the CEO nominated by
the lender sold assets to pay off part of FMC's loans, arguably to the
detriment of FMC. Farah illustrates how liability can result from
interlocking directorships when, in essence, the directors are serving
two masters.
Liability based on division of loyalty can also arise when the lender
forces a specific consultant on the borrower. For example, in Credit
6
Managers Association of Southern California v. Superior Court,'1
the debtor alleged the bank threatened to call the loan unless the
solvent debtor hired a business consultant. °7 The consultant, hired
over the debtor's objection, allegedly assumed complete control and
instituted restrictive practices without director or shareholder approval.108 The California Court of Appeal found the complaint stated
a cause of action against the lender. The decision was based on the
fact that the consultant supplanted and overruled the board of directors. 09 The consultant could not rightfully assume this position when
his allegiance was primarily to the lender.
Interference with the debtor's assets to the detriment of junior or
unsecured creditors can also result in liability. In In re Process-Manz
Press, Inc.,"' the lender arranged for Process Manz to repurchase its

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 690.
106. 51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975).
107. Id. at 355, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 359-60, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 247. But see In re Prima, 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938).
In Prima, the debtor's acquiescence in the bank's recommendation to hire a particular general
manager was insufficient to constitute domination of the debtor's will, even though the bank
threatened to call its outstanding loans in the event the debtor failed to comply. The court
found the bank was not a fiduciary; therefore, its threat to call the loans was not overreaching
but rather was a lawful exercise of the lender's legal right. Id. at 965.
110. 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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outstanding preferred stock, in exchange for Process-Manz's canceling
an inter-company debt of almost $3 million, which was owed by its
parent."' The inter-company indebtedness arose when Process-Manz
transferred loan proceeds received from the lender to its parent.112
The repurchase eliminated a substantial asset of Process-Manz,
$200,000 of working capital."'
The court upheld the referee in bankruptcy's order to subordinate
the lender's entire claim against Process-Manz to the claims of ProcessManz's unsecured creditors."4 The court reasoned the lender was not
a secured creditor. Rather, the lender in essence owned Process-Manz
since it had gained control of ninety percent of the company's stock
pledged as security for the loan. 1 5 Subordination appears justified
since the parent and lender conspired to use Process-Manz's assets
for the parent's benefit to the unsecured creditors' detriment.116
Additionally, liability to the debtor's creditors can arise under a
misrepresentation theory when a lender's conduct induces those creditors to extend credit to the common debtor. 1 7 In Central States
Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equipment Co., 18 one of the debtor's customers wished to hire the debtor to manufacture an expensive piece
of equipment." 9 The customer telephoned the bank requesting information concerning the debtor's financial solvency.120 The bank gave the
customer a good report when, in reality, the debtor was in desperate
financial straits. 2 ' The debtor did not use the customer's payments to

111. Id. at 338-39.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 348.
114. Id. at 349.
115. Id. Cf. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098
(5th Cir. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974). In evaluating the elements necessary
to establish control under an instrumentality theory, the court stated that a dominant corporation's stock ownership in the subservient corporation does not per se resolve the ownership
issue. Id. at 1104.
116. See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 10, at 350. In Farah,the sale of assets coupled
with influence on the debtor's board of directors triggered liability to the company itself. In
Process-Manz, the stripping of vital assets alone was enough to trigger liability. However,
liability was not limited to the debtor. Process-Manzillustrates how a lender may be held liable
not only to the debtor, but also to third parties, such as, the debtor's other creditors.
117. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1985);
Central State Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1984); see supra
note 7.
118. 727 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1984).
119. Id. at 1406.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1406-07.
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begin manufacturing the equipment, but instead paid down the creditor
bank's loan.

'*

The court affirmed the lower court decision in favor of

the customer. The court imposed a duty on the bank to respond honestly to the customer once it undertook to advise the customer of the
m
debtor's financial condition.'
E.

The Future of the Excessive Control Liability Theories

The success of the theories of fraud, duress, misrepresentation,
and interference illustrates the courts' and juries' increased sensitivity
to a borrower's interest in independent control of its business.'2 These
theories equitably balance both the lender's and borrower's interests.a2
Lenders may protect their financial interests; however, they must also
respect the interests of others.
Unlike the failure to exercise control theory in which a lender faces
additional risks without the commensurate rewards,126 these theories
punish creditors who take unfair advantage of their position at
another's expense.m Since these theories can reasonably apply to the
lender-borrower relationship, borrowers will continue using them to
retaliate against overreaching creditors. Lenders who fail to take heed
will face harsh consequences.'m

122. Id. at 1407.
123. Id. at 1409.
124. This success is illustrated by the large judgments awarded against lenders. See supra
note 1.
125. These theories better protect the borrowers' interest in controlling their own business
affairs than the theories asserted in early cases. See cases cited supra note 32. The cases
discussed earlier are more lenient toward lender's control or interference in the borrower's
business affairs. For instance, the lender in Chicago Mill exercised influence in the election of
the mill's officers. The loyalty of these newly elected officers, due to their affiliation with the
creditor and their action taken as officers is questionable. In Farah,however, the borrower
was able to attack just that type of lender misconduct using different theories. While the lender
misconduct in Farahwas arguably more egregious than the lender's conduct in Chicago Mill,
this comparison illustrates the importance of choosing the proper theory under which to proceed.
In view of the court's analysis, Chicago Mill was probably correctly decided.
These theories are not, however, one-sided. They also provide safeguards for lenders acting
reasonably to protect their legitimate interests. See supra note 27.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
127. See supra text accompanying note 22.
128. Lenders who fail to change lending practices to avoid liability under these theories
will suffer due to the potential for punitive damages under these theories. Mitchell v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1984).
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F. FiduciaryRelationships Between a Lender and Borrower
Borrowers often assert that circumstances warrant finding a
1 The confiduciary relationship'2 between the lender and borrower. 30
sequences of finding such a relationship are dramatic because the
lender must put the borrower's interests first. 3 ' Imposing a fiduciary
duty requires the lender to disclose confidential information not normally disclosed, and to refrain from self-dealing and other actions
against the borrower's interests.' 1 If a fiduciary relationship exists,
a court may hold the lender responsible for all the debtor's obligations.'1 Further, a court may hold the lender liable in tort and require
the lender to reverse its former dealings with the borrower.'3

129. In defining the term fiduciary relations, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979)
states in pertinent part:
A relation subsisting between two persons in regard to a business, contract, or
piece of property, or in regard to the general business or estate of one of them,
of such a character that each must repose trust and confidence in the other and
must exercise a corresponding degree of fairness and good faith. Out of such a
relation, the law raises the rule that neither party may exert influence or pressure
upon the other, take selfish advantage of his trust, or deal with the subject-matter
of the trust in such a way as to benefit himself or prejudice the other except in
the exercise of the utmost good faith and with the full knowledge and consent of
that other, business shrewdness, hard bargaining, and astuteness to take advantage
of the forgetfulness or negligence of another being totally prohibited as between
persons standing in such a relation to each other. Examples of fiduciary relations
are those existing between attorney and client, guardian and ward, principal and
agent, executor and heir, trustee and cestui que trust, landlord and tenant, etc.
Id.
130. In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986); In re W.T.
Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Prima Co, 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938); In re
Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188
(Mont. 1984). See also D. RoME, supra note 23,
8.04, 8-18 to 8-19; Schechter, supra note
22, at 93740.
131. A fiduciary is "[a] person having duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily
for another's benefit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 563 (5th ed. 1979). See Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295 (1939).
132. Cappello, Banking Malpractice?, CASE & CoM. Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 3, 6.
133. Schechter, supra note 22, at 939.
134. Id. A lender may be found liable in tort for breach of fiduciary duty. For a fiduciary's
standard of conduct, see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939). The finding of a fiduciary
obligation can also subject the lender to attacks under a theory of constructive fraud, where a
lender may be held liable for misrepresentations made without knowledge of their falsity. In
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985),
the court found a quasi fiduciary relationship existed between a bank and depositor because
banking performs an important public service, is a highly regulated industry, and the depositor
depends totally on the bank for protection of those funds. This holding was expanded in Barrett
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A fiduciary relationship can arise under various circumstances. For
instance, the relationship can arise when a lender gives a borrower
business advice or acts as the borrower's personal financial advisor. 1"
Additionally, it may arise from interlocking directorships when a director simultaneously serves on both the lender's and borrower's
boards.136 When the lender serves on both boards, interests of the
37
lender and borrower are especially likely to diverge.
In Deist v. Wachholz, the Montana Supreme Court found the lender
owed a fiduciary duty to a borrower."8 In Deist, the vendor of a ranch
and her husband dealt with the bank for twenty-four years prior to
the husband's death. 139 After her husband's death, the wife-vendor
reposed a trust on a bank officer who acted as her financial advisor
respecting the ranch debt. 40 The bank officer did not disclose his
membership in the partnership purchasing the ranch. 4, The court held
the bank officer to a fiduciary standard which required the officer to
insure the wife was not "insufficiently informed of some factor which
could affect [her] judgment" in the sale of the ranch.'4

v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986) where the court found the
bank had become the debtor's fiduciary and could be held liable under a theory of constructive
fraud for making false promises to release the debtor's guarantors after a proposed merger. Id.
at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21. Finally, in Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984), the
court found the lender breached the fiduciary duty owed to the borrower by not considering
the borrower's best interests. This breach amounted to constructive fraud. Id. at 198. For more
on fiduciary duties in banking, see Hagedorn, FiduciaryAspects of the Bank-Customer Relationship, 34 J. Mo. B. 406 (1978).
135. See Dennis v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank, No. 18738, slip op. (Perry County Ct. of Common
Pleas, Ohio, Mar. 14, 1985) (cited in, Moss, BorrowersFightBack With Lender Liability, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1, 1987, at 64, 67). In Dennis, a jury awarded a farmer $1.04 million offset by the
loan amount of $700,000. The bank was found to have assumed a fiduciary relationship when it
advised the farmer how to run the farm and the advice resulted in financial losses. See also
Credit Managers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975). In
Credit Managers, the lender installed a consultant over the borrower's objections. The court
stated that the complete control over the debtor's operations assumed by the consultant could
properly have led the trial court to conclude the consultant had a fiduciary obligation to the
debtor, the debtor's creditors and to the debtor's stockholders. Id. at 359-60, 124 Cal. Rptr. at
247. See also Crystal Springs Trust Co. v. First State Bank, 732 P.2d 819 (former bank president
and bank held liable for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation), modified,
736 P.2d 95 (Mont. 1987); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984) (lender owed fiduciary
duty to borrower for assuming the role as the borrower's financial advisor).
136. D. RoME, supra note 23, at 8-11.
137. Id.
138. 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984).
139. Id. at 193.
140. Id. at 194.
141. Id. at 192.
142. Id. at 195 (quoting Lloyds Bank, Ltd. v. Burdy, 3 All. E.R. 757, 768 (1974)). The
court found substantial evidence existed that the contract terms favored the partnership, in
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Most courts, however, are reluctant to hold a creditor to a fiduciary
standard. 4 3 In In re Teltronics Services, Inc.,' certain loan agreement
covenants required Teltronics to purchase equipment from the lender
and restricted its-outside financing to a predetermined level while the
loans remained outstanding.' 45 The court found these restraints did
not give the lender control over the borrower's lifeline. 146 In finding
that no fiduciary relationship existed, the court stated the loan agreement covenants were not unusual and the creditor's careful watch
47
over the debtor's financial situation was not inherently wrong.
Moreover, the court held that a creditor is generally not the debtor's fiduciary. 14 A fiduciary relationship exists only when a creditor
exercises such extensive control that it amounts to domination of a
debtor's will. 149 No such merger of identity existed between the lender
and Teletronics since "[the lender] owned no stock, had no contractual
right to participate in management, and shared no common officers
or directors with Teltroncs."150 Instead, the lender's actions exhibited
sound business judgment to protect the lender's financial interests. 1E
G. The Future of FiduciaryRelationships in the
Lender-Borrower Relationship
While courts often suggest a fiduciary relationship between a lender
and borrower exists, 52 courts rightly have been reluctant to impose

which the bank officer was a member, at the expense of the borrower. Id. at 198. The court
found the bank officer breached his fiduciary duty and did not consider the borrower's best
interests. Id.
143. In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822
(1983); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818
(1983); Ingram v. Lehr, 41 F.2d 169, 170 (9th Cir. 1930); Crowder v. Allen-West Comm'n Co.,
213 F. 177, 184 (8th Cir. 1914).
144. 29 Bankr. 139 (Banlr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
145. Id. at 172.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 170.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 172.
151. Id. The lender had imposed payment terms on Teltronics and had declined to provide
additional financing. Id. In addition, the lender had closely monitored Teltronics' financial position
and had recommended that Teltronics scale down its growth projections. Id.
152. See, e.g., Commons v. Schine, 35 Cal. App. 3d 141, 110 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1973). In
Commons, the court stated that "[t]he corporate controller-dominator is treated in the same
manner as a director of an insolvent corporation and thus occupies a fiduciary relationship to
its creditors." Id. at 144, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
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such a relationship. 153 Using the fiduciary relationship as an analytical
method has created a confusing conglomeration of cases.'5 These cases
have been criticized for failing to explain the basis of creditor control
liability and failing to supply a consistent precedent for any proposed
rule. 15 As a result, judicial time is often wasted determining whether
relationship falls within the category of this special rea particular
lationship. 156
Some courts recognize the practical problems associated with imposing a fiduciary duty on a lender. 157 Such a relationship contradicts
the relative positions lenders and borrowers ordinarily assume. 158 Generally, lending relationships are the result of arm's-length bargaining.
Thus, obligating a lender to act as a fiduciary for interests on the
opposite side of the negotiating table is illogical. 159
To find a fiduciary relationship, the lender-borrower relationship
should exhibit particular circumstances deserving special protection.160
Only when a lender merges with the identity of the borrower does
the lender join the borrower's entrepreneurial effort and enjoy the
corresponding economic benefits. 61 The corresponding economic reward from such pervasive involvement sufficiently justifies imposing
a special obligation.1 62 In light of the chilling consequences,e6 a lesser
standard would be inequitable. 6 4 Lenders should not be deterred from

153. See Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part II - The JudicialDecisions, 100
BANKING L.J. 325, 331 (1983). For cases refusing to find a fiduciary relationship between a
debtor and creditor, see Delta Diversified, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Natl Bank, 171 Ga. App. 625,
320 S.E.2d 767 (1984) (no confidential relationship between bank and customers); Centerre Bank
v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
154. See Symons, supra note 153, at 332.
155. See Schechter, supra note 22, at 940.
156. Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation:PartI -- The Relevance of ContractDoctrine,
100 BANKING L.J. 220, 225 (1983).
157. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 818 (1983).
1,58.
Id.
159. Id.
160. See Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1984) (special relationship by showing
customer reliance for many years); Symons, supra note 156, at 225.
161. See Bartlett & Lapatin, The Status of a Creditoras a "ControllingPerson,"28 MERCER
L. REV. 639, 655-57 (1977). Under this framework, the court's holding in Deist can perhaps be
justified. The bank officer's economic gain from participating in the ranch purchase arguably
justified his cast in a new role.
162. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
164. Like the liability theory for failure to exercise control, a lesser standard for finding a
fiduciary duty exists would subject a lender to additional risks without the commensurate reward
for the risk assumption. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
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some involvement with the borrower to protect their financial interests. Indeed, such inactivity would violate the duty owed to the
lender's own creditors and equity holders. 16
Courts should require complete domination or merger of interests
to impose a fiduciary obligation. Requiring the lender and borrower's
interests to merge mitigates the practical problems inherent in imposing a fiduciary obligation on a lender. If the lender so pervades the
borrower's business, they no longer occupy opposite sides of the
negotiating table. 16
Borrowers should note the heavy burden necessary to impose a
fiduciary obligation on a lender.'6 For this reason, resort to the excessive control liability theories will likely be more appropriate to combat
lender misconduct.'r This approach is more consistent with the basic
nature of the debtor-creditor relationship.
H. Liability Under the Alter Ego or Instrumentality Theory
Another theory used to assert lender liability is the alter ego or
instrumentality theory. Under this theory, damages are not limited
to those incurred during the controlling period. Rather, an alter ego
is liable for all the dominated entity's obligations, both in contract and
tort.6 Like the standard of liability imposed on the lender under the

165. In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 610-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
166. Since this standard is similar to that imposed under the instrumentality theory, the
cases decided under the instrumentality theory can provide valuable guidance for the application
of the fiduciary obligation to the lender-borrower context. Cf. In re Krivo Indus. Supply Co.
v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973) (only when a lender completely dominates the borrower will liability result under the instrumentality rule), nwdified
490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974); Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(lender must dominate the will of debtor for a fiduciary obligation to arise). Since the consequences of finding a fiduciary duty surpass those resulting under the instrumentality rule, it
has been suggested that a stricter standard than that imposed under the instrumentality rule
be required before a fiduciary duty is found. Schechter, supra note 22, at 938-39. Under the
instrumentality rule, an alter ego may be held responsible for all the debtor's obligations no
matter when they arise. Id. at 939. However, a fiduciary may also be liable in tort and be
required to reverse former dealings with the debtor. Id.
167. In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 Bankr. 139, 170 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). See also
Edwards v. Northwestern Bank, 39 N.C. Ct. App. 261, 250 S.E.2d 651 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
In Edwards, the court stated that a 'iduciary duty arises only when the evidence establishes
that the party providing financing to a corporation completely dominates and controls its affairs."
Id. at 277, 250 S.E.2d at 662.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
169. See H. BALLENTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 296.01
n.5 (1949).
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fiduciary theory, 17 0 the standard for liability under the instrumentality
theory requires complete domination. 171
Recent litigation exemplifies the broader latitude extended a lender
under the alter ego theory. In Krivo IndustrialSupply Co. v. National
Distillers & Chemical Corp.,"1 the plaintiffs were creditors of the
insolvent debtor.7 The plaintiffs sued National Distillers, the parent
of the Bridgeport Brass Company (Brass), the debtor's major
supplier. 174 Brass had changed the debt from an unsecured obligation
to a secured note. 175 When the debtor experienced financial difficulty,
National Distillers agreed to provide additional funding and internal
financial management assistance. 176 The creditor sent one of its internal
auditors to the debtor's premises to oversee the debtor's finances. The
creditor further agreed to assist the debtor in liquidating unprofitable
assets to provide working capital.17 In return, the debtor executed
notes for amounts due and secured them with various assets, including
capital stock of various corporations it owned. Despite these efforts,
the debtor ceased operations. 17s
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision
that insufficient evidence existed to establish a jury question on the
control issue. 179 The court held liability under the instrumentality rule
requires significant facts indicating the creditor assumed actual, participatory, total control of the debtor.' 8 Active involvement in the
debtor corporation's management did not automatically constitute liability.'8 ' The court then concluded that liability under the instrumentality theory requires total domination, preventing the subservient
corporation from enjoying any independent corporate interests. '1 Finally, fraud or injustice must result from misuse of the control.13

170.
171.
(5th Cir.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra text accompanying note 149.
Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106
1973), nodified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
483 F.2d at 1101.
Id. at 1108-09.
Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
Id. at 1106.

183. Id.
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Under this framework, the court found National's shared responsibility for some, but not all aspects of the debtor's operation insufficient
to impose liability. 184 The court also found National's power to exert
substantial pressure on the debtor inherent in any debtor-creditor
relationship. 1 Power alone does not constitute control under the instrumentality rule. 186
I.

The Future of the Instrumentality Theory in the
Lender-BorrowerRelationship

The alter ego or instrumentality theory developed from corporate
law. s7 Historically, courts have employed the theory to disregard the
corporate fiction, imposing liability on shareholders and parent companies for obligations of the corporation they control2es Because a
corporation is designed primarily to shelter shareholders and corporate
officers from liability, 18 the stringent standard of complete domination
under this liability theory seems justified.'9 In contrast, the lenderborrower is a contractual relationship where the need to shelter persons from liability does not exist. Despite the absence of the need to
shelter the lender from liability, the stringent standard retains its
vitality through precedent and, thus will be applied to determine lender liability.
Consequently, borrowers carry a heavy burden to establish liability
under this theory. 9' Krivo illustrated this burden where even the

184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1114.
Id.
See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 43-43.60 (perm. ed. 1963).
188. Id.
189. For reasons justifying corporations' limited liability, see Posner, The Rights of Creditors
of Affiliated Corporations,43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 507-09 (1976) (a corporation's creditors are
in a better position to appraise the risks of extending the corporation credit than are its shareholders). See also Halpern, Trebilock, & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporate Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980). But see Landers, A Unified Approach to
Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975).
190. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th
Cir. 1973) (the instrumentality rule requires complete domination so that the subservient entity
maintains no separate interests and operates only to achieve the goals of the dominant corporation), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
191.

See id. at 1106 (quoting 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

§ 43 (perm. ed. 1963)) (to establish liability under the instrumentality theory,
borrowers must establish that the lender controlled the borrower and that they no longer
retained a separate existence). Professor Fletcher states:
CORPORATIONS
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lender's substantial influence and pressure on the debtor did not lead
to liability. Given the instrumentality theory's historical development
and stringent standard, the theory is not likely to greatly expand
lender liability.
III.

LENDER LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF GOOD FAITH

A developing branch of case law holds lenders liable for breaching
the obligation of good faith implied in every contract through the
Uniform Commercial Code section 1-203.192 U.C.C. § 1-201(19) defines

good faith as honesty in fact. 193 In essence, good faith requires that
parties cooperate so that neither will be deprived of reasonable expectations.""

The concept of good faith is not new. Classical Roman law recognized good faith s9 and English courts applied it to the English law
merchant.'9 Today, the Uniform Commercial Code, which is the law
in all states except Louisiana, expressly adopts the concept. 1' The

The control necessary to invoke what is sometimes called the "instrumentality rule"
is not mere majority or complete stock control but such domination of finances,
policies and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate
mind, will or existence of its own and is but a business conduit for its principal.
1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43.10 (pern. ed.

1983).
192. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978) provides that "[elvery contract or duty within this Act imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Louisiana is the only state which
has failed to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code.
193. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978) states " 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned." Id.
194. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963).
195. Roman law implied a general obligation of good faith in the performance of informal
consensual contracts much like the U.C.C. does today. See F. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER
LooKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 124-25 (1955).

196. English law used good faith in connection with both good faith performance and good
faith purchase. Farnsworth, supranote 194, at 670. The U.C.C. adopts this approach implying
a general obligation of good faith performance through U.C.C. § 1-203 and an obligation of good
faith purchase through, for example, U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1) and 3-302. For more on good faith
purchase generally, see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
L.J. 1057 (1954). For a general overview of the history behind the adoption of the good faith
obligation into the U.C.C., see Farnsworth, supra note 194. The U.C.C. uses the good faith
obligation in two senses, good faith purchase and good faith performance. The obligation of a
good faith purchase is generally concerned with a state of mind, a subjective inquiry. In contrast,
the obligation of good faith in performance evaluates the reasonableness or fairness of the
performance, an objective standard. Id.
197. 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 1 (1976). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) also imposes the duty of good faith. The Restatement provides "[elvery
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entrance of good faith into the banking industry, however, is new.
While a few courts used this theory to assert lender liability in the

mid-sixties, 198 breach of good faith has only recently gained widespread
prominence in asserting lender misconduct. 199

Generally, courts apply the good faith obligation in two areas.
First, courts may obligate a lender to exercise discretion in good faith.
The typical loan agreement allows the lender to exercise discretion to
determine when to accelerate a loan . 2 ° For example, loan agreements
often include acceleration clauses allowing the lender to accelerate
when the loan becomes insecure.201 Other clauses specify an event
upon which default will occur, such as upon sale 2°2 or lease2O3 of the

collateral. U.C.C. § 1-208 imposes a good-faith duty on a lender de-

contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement." Id.
198. See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964) (obligation of good faith breached when lender lulled a borrower into a false sense of security and
then accelerated); Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
(lender may accelerate debt when it deems itself insecure, but the insecurity must be reasonable
and not made in bad faith).
199. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trast Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
200. The lender's discretion is most evident when the loan agreement contains an acceleration clause under which the lender can accelerate when he deems himself insecure. U.C.C. §
1-208 (1978) imposes a duty of good faith on the lender's exercise of such a clause. U.C.C. §
1-208 provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment
or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or "When he
deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean
that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect
of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good
faith is on the party against whom the power has been exercised.
Id.
201. See supranote 200. For cases which assert a lender's breach of good faith for declaring
a loan in default or terminating a line of credit, see K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1985) (lender liable for failing to give prior notice before refusing to extend funds
under a line of credit); Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth Gen., Ltd., 386 So. 2d 31 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1980) (lender justified in terminating line of credit due to bankruptcy of debtor's
subsidiary and, therefore, did not breach obligation of good faith); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombley,
689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (lender could be held liable for punitive damages for breach of good
faith when one bank officer offset against a borrower's account after another officer had agreed
to convert the loan to an installment obligation); Yankton Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 219
Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430 (1985) (case remanded for a determination of whether lender acted
in bad faith in refusing to make loans to finance the borrower's expansion of his livestock
operations).
202. Brummund v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 N.M. 221, 656 P.2d 884 (1983).
203. Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
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claring default under an insecurity clause.204 Courts, however, have
distinguished between insecurity clauses and default clauses, which
place control of the event causing default with the debtor.20 5 When
2 6
the debtor has control over the event, good faith is inapplicable.
Second, courts imply an obligation of good faith when the lender
and borrower establish a course of dealing which varies with the
express loan terms °7 The borrower may rely on this pattern of lender
2°
conduct believing it has more time to pay the loan or cure a default. 8
In these circumstances, the courts generally require the lender to

notify the borrower before taking any action against the loan. 2°9
The broad nature of the U.C.C. good faith provision has led to
inconsistent applicaton. Courts differ on whether the obligation of
210
good faith should apply to a creditor's decision to call a demand note.
Further, courts continue to disagree whether to evaluate a creditor's
actions by a subjective or objective standard of good faith.211

204. See supra note 200.
205. Abrego v. United Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Ark. 308, 664 S.W.2d 858
(1984); Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528, 637 S.W.2d 560 (1982); Hickmon v. Beene, 6 Ark. App.
272, 640 S.W.2d 812 (1982); Brummund v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 N.M. 221, 656 P.2d 884 (1983);
In re Sutton Inv., Inc., 46 N.C. App. 654, 266 S.E.2d 686 (1980).
206. See, e.g., Bowen v. Danna, 276 Ark. 528, 637 S.W.2d 560 (1982); Hickmon v. Beene,
6 Ark. App. 272, 640 S.W.2d 812 (1982).
207. This situation can arise when a lender accepts late payments. Alaska Statebank v.
Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
208. See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964). In
Skeels, the lender financed the borrower's automobile inventory. Id. at 848. Upon discovery
that several cars had been sold out of trust, the lender repossessed the inventory effectively
destroying the borrower's business. Id. at 851. The lender was found liable for his persistent
assurances of further advances and quick actions in contradiction with those statements in its
repossession of the inventory. Id. However, an award of punitive damages was reversed. Id.
at 852.
209. For cases finding the obligation of good faith implied a notice requirement, see K.M.C.
Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983); Cobb v.
Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1980).
210. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (good faith applies to
decision of whether to call a demand note). For cases finding good faith inapplicable to demand
notes, see Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1986); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980);
Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
211. The controversy surrounding the proper standard for good faith originated in England
with Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (K.B. 1801). Weston applied a subjective
standard introducing the test of the pure heart and empty head. Another case, Gill v. Cubitt,
3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824), discarded the subjective test and replaced it
with the reasonable man standard, an objective test. In 1836, Gill was overruled by Goodman
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This section will first examine the application of good faith to
demand notes. Next, this section will highlight typical lender actions
which have led to liability for breach of good faith. Specifically, discretionary decisions and courses of conduct causing lender liability will
be concisely reviewed.
A. Application of Good Faith to Demand Notes
The good faith concept received widespread recognition as a basis
for asserting lender liability in K.M.C., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.212
K.M.C. represents the most expansive application of the good faith
213
concept. In K.M.C., Irving Trust Co. appealed from a $7.5 million

v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B. 1836). In 1857, the United States Supreme
Court decided to follow Goodman which instituted the subjective standard into the United
States. See Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 343 (1857).
Today, alternating between subjective and objective standards continues. Under the subjective standard, a lender must only honestly believe the debtor's financial condition has deteriorated
and correctness of the belief is irrelevant. Under the objective standard, the lender must
reasonably believe this with the reasonableness of his belief measured by circumstantial events.
Other lenders in the same situation should be inclined to the same belief. The standard applied,
however, may be of little significance since a jury operating under a subjective standard will
consider the reasonableness of the belief in determining its honesty. However, the standard
applied may affect the proof supplied to evaluate the belief. For cases advocating a subjective
standard, see Quest v. Barnett Bank, 397 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981); Karner v. Willis,
238 Kan. 246, 710 P.2d 21 (1985). For cases adopting an objective standard, see K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1979). When the U.C.C. was presented for adoption in 1952, the reasonable commercial
standard had been removed from the good faith general definition in § 1-203. The removal had
been suggested by the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 194, at 673.
212. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
213. In K.M.C., the lenders objected to the damages as excessive because K.M.C.'s value
was less than the jury's award of $7,500,000. Id. at 766. The appraiser in the case based his
valuation on K.M.C.'s projected performance following acquisition by a larger company, not on
what it would have done had it remained privately owned. Id. at 764. In doing this the appraiser
built into his valuation certain assumptions with respect to advantages enjoyed by larger over
mid-sized companies. Id. The court responded that since the jury could have determined that
K.M.C. would have been valued by larger companies based on these assumptions, the appraiser's
approach was acceptable. Id. The court further stated that
[wie are not insensitive to Irving's complaint that K.M.C.'s value on March 1,
1982, was less than the jury's award of $7,500,000. It is plain from the record that
the company was heavily leveraged, its heavy losses in 1981 had eroded stockholder
equity, and it had a substantial amount of uncollectible receivables in excess of its
bad debt reserve. Nevertheless, the Magistrate concluded that the damage award
was not outside the limits of the reasonable range, and we are constrained to agree.
Id. at 766.
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jury214 verdict

in favor of K.M.C., a wholesale and retail grocery business. 215 Irving and K.M.C. had entered into a financing agreement in
which Irving held a security interest in all of K.M. C.'s accounts receivable and inventory.216 In exchange, Irving granted K.M.C. a $3.5 million
line of credit with funds to be advanced at Irving's discretion.217 The
financing agreement also contained a payable on demand provision.218
K.M.C. claimed Irving's refusal to advance funds was in bad faith
and destroyed K.M.C.'s business. 21 9 Because a bank officer believed
K.M.C.'s business was collapsing the bank denied a request for an

advance well within the $3.5 million limit.220 Irving admitted, however,
to being fully secured on the day it refused the advance to K.M.C.22'
Three days later, Irving resumed financing.22 Nevertheless, K.M.C.'s
business failed. 2 K.M.C. based its damages on this three day gap in

financing.24
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury award finding good faith required Irving to notify the borrower to allow sufficient time to seek

214. The loan agreement between Irving and K.M.C. contained a jury waiver provision
stating that each party "waives all right to a trial by jury in any action or proceeding relating
to transactions under this Agreement." Id. at 755. Nevertheless, K.M.C. was held entitled to
a jury. In reaching this decision, the court noted that the right to jury trial is governed by
federal not state law. Id. The right may only be waived if done 'nowingly, voluntarily and
intentionally." Id. K.M.C. contended that its consent to this provision was not done knowingly
and voluntarily since before signing the agreement Irving represented to the K.M.C. president
that the waiver provision would not be enforced absent fraud, which was not present in the
K.M.C. case. This statement was sufficient to show K.M.C. had not consented knowingly and
voluntarily. In addition, the court held this statement admissible despite the parol evidence rule
due to the unique nature of the bargain as one involving waiver of a constitutional right. In
this situation, the court found that the parol evidence rule should not be rigidly applied. Id. at
757 n.5. The parol evidence rule may bar statements made by bank representatives when
constitutional rights or fraud are not involved. See, e.g., Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc.,
705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (The borrowers alleged the lenders made representations
that if the borrowers signed personal guarantees, the lender would extend further credit and
not call the note due. The court held this separate oral agreement inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule.).
215. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 754.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 759.
219. Id. at 754.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 761.
222. Id. at 762.
223. Id. at 754.
224. Id. at 762.
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alternative financing.2 The court rejected Irving's argument that requiring notice would be inconsistent with the agreement provisions
maling the loan payable on demand. 226 The court found the good faith

obligation limited Irving's discretion to advance and its power to demand repayment.227
The K.M.C. court's application of good faith to demand notes has
been viewed as suspect. 2 However, the financing arrangement which
gave Irving substantial power over K.M.C. arguably justifies the decision.m Under the financing arrangement, K.M.C. deposited all its
receipts into an account to which Irving had sole access.2 ° If Irving
refused to lend funds K.M.C. would be left without operating capital

until it paid its loan.281 Without the implied obligation of good faith,
the court found K.M.C.'s continued existence was left entirely to the
whim of Irving. m
Not all courts have applied the good faith obligation so expansively. m Many courts have rejected the K.M.C. application of good

225. Id. at 759. The court found notice to the borrower was required "absent valid business
reasons precluding Irving from doing so." Id. Moreover, these business justifications would be
evaluated objectively. Id. at 761.
226. Id. at 759. Irving raised several issues on appeal. Irving claimed that 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) (1985), which permits a magistrate to conduct a civil trial upon the parties' consent, was
unconstitutional. Irving also claimed that the magistrate should not have granted K.M.C. a jury
trial and the magistrate admitted incompetent expert testimony on the issue of damages. Id.
at 755. Finally, Irving asserted it acted in good faith and therefore did not breach the financing
agreement. Id. at 754-55. The court rejected each of these claims. Id. at 755, 758-59, 764.
227. Id. at 760.
228. See Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1986).
229. Further, the court based its holding on the lender's failure to notify the borrower
before refusing to advance funds. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 759. Consequently, the court's finding
that good faith applies to the demand for repayment is dicta.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. The court stated, "if a notice was requisite to [the agreement's] proper execution,
a convenant to give such notice will be inferred, for any other construction would make the
contract unreasonable, and place one of the parties entirely at the mercy of the other." Id.
(quoting Wells V. Alexandre, 130 N.Y. 642, 29 N.E. 142, 143 (1891)).
233. See, e.g., English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983) (criticizing the imposition of
good faith to loan convenants). The court stated
This concept is contrary to our well-reasoned and long established adversary system
which has served us ably in Texas for almost 150 years. Our system permits parties
who have a dispute over a contract to present their case to an impartial tribunal
for a determination of the agreement as made by the parties and embodied in the
contract itself. To adopt the laudatory sounding theory of "good faith and fair
dealing" would place a party under the onerous threat of treble damages should
he seek to compel his adversary to perform according to the contract terms as
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faith to demand notes.23 In CenterreBank v. Distributors,Inc.,25 the

bank sued the loan guarantors to recover a deficiency,-3 and the
guarantors counterclaimed alleging bad faith, misrepresentation,
breach of fiduciary duty, prima facie tort, and breach of an oral contract
to continue to extend credit.27 The jury awarded the guarantors more
than $7.5 million. m
The Mississippi Court of Appeal reversed, holding the good faith
obligation inapplicable to demand instruments.23 Because the borrower
by his signature unconditionally agreed payment was immediately due,
the borrower could not contest the lender's decision to demand pay-

agreed upon by the parties. The novel concept advocated by the courts below
would abolish our system of government according to settled rules of law and let
each case be decided upon what might seem '"air and in good faith," by each fact
finder. This we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 522.
234. See, e.g., Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1986) (see infra notes 243-51 and accompanying text); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis
Denny Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980) (court of appeals held that good
faith did not limit a bank's power to seek payment on a demand note); Centerre Bank v.
Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (see infra notes 235-42 and accompanying
text); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricator, Inc. v. Peoples Natl Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 536 n.5,
518 P.2d 734, 738 n.5 (good faith under a state statute equivalent to U.C.C. § 1-203 is not a
factual issue in determining a bank's right to call a demand note), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967
(1974).
235. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
236. Id. at 44.
237. Id. at 44, 51, 53.
238. 705 S.W.2d at 44. The attorney for the defendants, James Wirken of Spradley &
Wirken in Kansas City, stated that defendants would have been satisfied if just the debt had
been canceled. Swartz, supranote 2, at 19. As in Centerre,juries may hit lenders with multimillion-dollar verdicts even when the borrowers are not pressing for them. Id.
239. 705 S.W.2d at 48. The plaintiffs alleged fraudulent inducement in signing the guarantees
due to the representation that the bank would not call the loan, but continue to extend credit.
Id. at 48-49. The court of appeal found that the plaintiffs were aware that the bank officer
making the statement was contingent on a loan committee's approval. Id. at 50. Hence, the
court found none of the plaintiffs had been misled by the loan officer's statement. Id. But cf.
First Nat'l Bank v. Twombley, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (lender breached good faith when
one loan officer offset against a borrower's account after another loan officer had agreed to
convert the loan to an installment program). On the fiduciary claim, the Centerre court found
that the relationship between the plaintiffs and the bank was merely that of a borrower and a
lender. 705 S.W.2d at 53. The court stated that no confidential or fiduciary relationship exists
between a lender and borrower of funds. Id. On the prima facie tort claim, the court found the
lenders had a valid business reason for calling the note due and this was sufficient to defeat
the tort claim. Id. at 54. Finally, on the oral contract claim, the court held that the personal
guarantees were fully integrated agreements and so evidence of an oral contract violated the
parol evidence rule. Id. at 52.
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ment at any time as being in bad faith.? 0 Imposing the good faith
obligation to a demand note, in effect, added a term to the agreement
the parties did not contemplate.21 The court refused to rewrite the
terms of the agreementA2
In Flagship National Bank v. Gray DistributionSystems, Inc.,2 3
the Florida Third District Court of Appeal went further than Centerre
by limiting the extent to which a course of conduct may modify a loan
agreement. In Flagship, the lender appealed a nonjury trial court
verdict in favor of the corporate borrowers and individual guarantors.?" During a workout, the corporate borrower signed a $400,000
demand note under which the borrower could not disburse funds without first obtaining lender approval.4 Over a four month period, the
lender advanced funds in excess of the loan amount.2 6 The trial court
found that during this four month period the parties' course of dealings
modified the loan agreement, binding the lender to continue extending
7
credit above the loan amount.A
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court
finding good faith inapplicable to a demand note. m The court recognized that under certain circumstances a course of conduct may modify
a written agreement.2 9 However, when the pattern of conduct contradicts the agreement express terms such that a consistent construction cannot be drawn, the terms of the written agreement prevail.2

240.
241.

705 S.W.2d at 48.
Id.

242.

Id. The facts revealed that the lender had given the borrower several months' notice

that the loan would be called and had worked with the borrower in an attempt to obtain alternate
financing. Id. at 46. This probably influenced the court's holding.
243. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986).

244. Id. at 1338.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1338-40.
247.

Id. at 1340.

248. Id. The court distinguished K.M.C. on the grounds that it involved a course of dealings
covering a three-year period and involved a discretionary decision of whether to advance funds,
not whether to call a loan. The court further stated that it found the K.M.C. court's application
of U.C.C. § 1-208 to demand instruments "suspect" and, hence, refused to follow the holding.
Id. at 1341.
249. Id. As authority for this proposition the court cited Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware
Co., 423 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982); Doral Country Club, Inc., v. Curcie Bros.,
Inc., 174 So. 2d 749 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 180 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1965).
250. The court cited to FLA. STAT. § 671.205(4) (1985).
[4]The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage
of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but

when such construction is unreasonble express terms control both course of dealing
and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
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Therefore, the course of dealings did not override the lending limit
set forth in the loan agreement and the loan could be called upon
demand.2'
U.C.C. § 1-208 specifically applies the good faith obligation to options to accelerate at will. 2 However, the official comment prevents
this section from applying to demand instruments whose very nature
allow a lender to call the note at any time without reason.a The
official comment calls into question the K.M.C. court's sweeping application of the good faith obligation to demand instruments. Further,
the court did not need to resort to good faith. The court could have
reached a just result using the traditional contract theories of modification, waiver, or estoppel.: Applying good faith to demand notes
means the note is not payable upon demand, but payable only when
demand is made in good faith. This contradicts the specific financing
agreement terms. Applying good faith to demand instruments contradicts the underlying purpose of good faith to protect the parties'
expectations.2 The practical result of holding good faith inapplicable
to demand instruments is to simply make bad faith unavailable as a
defense to a borrower subject to a lender's demand for payment under
a demand note.
A lender may not take total refuge in a loan agreement's demand
provision. The lender must still perform or enforce any right under
the demand note in good faith.2 In borderline cases, when loan agreements contain both a demand provision and a discretionary advance

Id. Cf. Yankton Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 615-16, 365 N.W.2d 430, 434
(1985) (court recognized that the obligation of good faith may override express loan provisions).
251. 485 So. 2d at 1340.
252. See supra note 200.
253. The official comment to U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978) states "[o]bviously this section has no
application to demand instruments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any time
with or without any reason. This section applies only to an agreement or to paper which in the
first instance is payable at a future date." Courts take the view that demand instruments are
payable immediately upon execution. Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank,
10 Wash. App. 530, 518 P.2d 734, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 967 (1974) ("It is elementary that a
demand note is payable immediately on the date of its execution."). Id. at 536, 518 P.2d at 738.
254. Tyler, supra, note 1, at 418. In his article, Tyler criticizes the K.M.C. court's use of
good faith and reasons that K.Y.C. could have been decided easily under traditional contract
principles. Id. at 418-19. Tyler suggests the court should have found the contract modified
through subsequent conduct or oral agreements; or that the lender waived a contractual right
or was estopped from exercising the contractual right. Id.
255. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
256. Good faith will still apply to other provisions of the contract through the general good
faith requirement imposed under U.C.C. § 1-203.
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provision, liability may turn on the borrower's dependence on the
lender and the extent of the lender's power to determine the fate of
the borrower's business. In this situation, borrowers may resort to
traditional contract theories for redress.257
B.

Course of Conduct Modifying Loan Agreement

A lender's course of conduct may modify the loan agreement, thus
preventing a lender from strictly enforcing the loan provisions.5 Consequently, courts may require lenders to notify borrowers before any
action is taken on a loan, despite an express loan provision stating no
such notification is required.2 9 Notification requirements typically
arise when the parties establish a course of conduct varying from the
26
express loan terms and the borrower relies on this conduct.
A pattern of conduct may override express loan provisions through
contract principles of modification and estoppel.261 For example, in
Alaska Statebank v. Fairco,262 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed an
award against a lender who repossessed cbllateral without notice after
negotiations failed to work out a deferred payment plan.2 The court
found the course of dealings and routine acceptance of late payments
had modified the express loan provisions. 26 The lenders were estopped

from repossessing the collateral without notice, even though the loan
agreement permitted it.26
257. See supra note 254.
258. See Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983); Varela v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 15 Cal. App. 3d 741, 93 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1971); Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Waters, 273
So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983); Nevada Nat'l Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 582 P.2d 364 (1978);
Fontaine v. Industrial Nat'l Bank of R.I., 111 R.I. 6, 298 A.2d 521 (1973).
259. Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
260. See supra note 258.
261. Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Waters, 273 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973); Cobb v.
Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1980); see also supra note 258.
262. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
263. Id. at 292-93.
264. Id. at 292 n.7. The court stated that although payments were due on the 10th of the
month, the bank routinely allowed payments by the 30th of the month. "By its acts and statements, the Bank modified the terms of the note such that the $120,000 note had not been
delinquent or in default by virtue of payments being made between the 10th and 30th of
the month." Id. Accord Pierce v. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 371, 372-73, 235 S.E.2d 752,
754 (1977); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1980); Nevada Nat'l
Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 513, 582 P.2d 364, 369 (1978).
265. 674 P.2d at 292. While acceptance of late payments may be found to modify a loan
agreement, nonwaiver clauses have been upheld. Van Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122
(Ind. 1981). But see Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 873-74 (10th Cir.
1981) (nonwaiver clause can be waived, and whether a waiver has occured is a jury question);
Smith v. General Fin. Corp., 243 Ga. 500, 255 S.E.2d 14 (1979).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss1/5

34

Cassedy: The Doctrine of Lender Liability
DOCTRINE OF LENDER LIABILITY

Courts have also invoked these contract principles to prevent a
lender from accelerating upon transfer of the collateral to a third
party. In Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 266 the court awarded
punitive damages against a secured creditor who accepted loan payments from a third party in possession of the collateral.2 67 The court
estopped the lender from asserting the transfer of the collateral was
a default.2 6 By continuing to accept payments from the third parties,
the lender had waived the default.2 69 Thus, the court found the lender
liable for conversion for repossessing the car when the loan was not
in default.20
Courts are generally hostile toward nonmonetary default clauses
permitting loans to be accelerated without showing the borrower's
future ability to make loan payments is impaired. In Brown v. Avemco
Investment Corp.,27 a lender accelerated the loan because the borrower breached a "due on lease" clause.s2 The Ninth Circuit held that
U.C.C. § 1-208 prevents a secured creditor from accelerating a loan
unless the creditor believes in good faith that the breach impaired
prospects for payment or performance.2 The lender never asserted
that loan payments were not being made or would not be made in the
future.2 4 Rather, the lender accelerated based on some uncertainty
about the borrower's insurance and lack of lender approval for the
collateral's lease.sa
The court applied U.C.C. § 1-208, classifying the clause as discretionary and thus, analogous to insecurity clasues governed by U.C.C.
§ 1-208.276 Hence, the good faith obligation qualified the lender's ability
to call the loan under the clause which, under section 1-208, required
the lender to be insecure regarding future payments.277

266. 693 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
267. Id. at 1377-79.
268. Id. at 1376.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1377.
271. 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
272. The clause provided that 'ifany or all of the property covered hereby be hereafter
sold, leased, transferred, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered without the written consent of
Secured Party ... then the whole principal sum unpaid upon said promissory note, with the
interest accrued thereon ...

shall immediately become due." Id. at 1369.

273. Id. at 1376-77.
274. Id. at 1371.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1378-79.
277. Id. at 1378.
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Sahadi v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.7 also
illustrates courts' suspicion of lenders who call a loan in default when
they are not threatened monetarily. In Sahadi, the lender called the
loan in default when the borrower failed to make a timely interest
payment.m However, evidence revealed the borrower had sufficient
deposits at the lender bank against which the lender could have set
off payment. ° Further, the lender did not show timely payments
were particularly important.2' The court reversed a summary judgment for the lender and remanded the case to determine whether the
lender had acted in good faith.3
C.

The Future of Good Faith

As the most open-ended liability theory, good faith is potentially
the most threatening to lenders. Borrowers may assert breach of good
faith when the lender's conduct falls short of fraud, duress, or interference.m Borrowers proceeding under this theory can perhaps attribute their phenomenal success to the ease with which jurors understand the theory, compounded by the dissatisfaction most jurors have
experienced with banks.2 Moreover, since courts broadly interpret
the good faith obligation, borrowers may more easily assert liability
for breach of this obligation and prevent reversal on appeal.2 Consequently, this theory will only increase in popularity for asserting
lender liability.
IV.

SETTING LIMITS FOR LENDER LIABILITY

The past two decades have brought forth expanding liability among
the professions. No logical explanation exists to shelter bankers from
liability when medical, legal, and accounting professionals are held
accountable for their misconduct. However, expanding liability, especially in the tort area, has been criticized as reaching a harmful level

278. 706 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983).
279. Id. at 194. There was further evidence that the lender had previously accepted late
payments under a predecessor loan agreement. Id.
280. Id. at 196.
281. Id. at 197.
282. Id. at 200.
283. For example, a lender may be found liable for failure to give notice before declaring
default. See supra note 259, at 292-93.
284. Swartz, supra note 2, at 16.
285. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
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prompting legislative response.2 For instance, the Florida Legislature
enacted the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 as a comprehensive
measure to address a general liability crisis.2
Lender liability also has the potential to reach harmful levels.2
Because lender liability is a new area, its parameters are presently
undefined. The increased publicity of multimillion dollar awards has

led to a substantial increase in the number of lender liability claims.m
Viewed optimistically, more responsible lender conduct should result.

However, publicity also carries the potential for runaway juries and
the assertion of spurious claims. The judiciary can begin shaping
reasonable contours for lender liability. Consistently applying the lia-

bility theories coupled with treating lenders and borrowers equally
will result in greater certainty in this area.2 ° Prudent application
should encourage a more efficient operation of the credit markets.2 1

Examining the role senior creditors play in the credit market will
help delineate limits which should be placed on lender liability.2 2 Recently, the benefits of a senior creditor's monitoring expertise have

been recognized.m Senior creditors in protecting their own interests

286. The expansion of liability has been blamed for the skyrocketing costs of insurance
premiums. Staff of the Fla. Sen. Comm. on Commerce, FLORIDA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REFORM AND A REVIEW OF COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION,

30 (Jan. 1988).

287. Id. For a comprehensive review of Florida's Tort Reform Act, see id.
288. In fact, lender liability has been labeled the motor vehicle torts of the eighties. Swartz,
supra note 2, at 19.
289. Moss, supranote 16, at 66; Swartz, supranote 2, at 19; Tyler, supra, note 1, at 441.
290. NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1987).
291. The debtor-creditor relationship embraces a variety of risks which cannot be fully
anticipated. With the addition of the uncertainty of lender liability, the difficulty of properly
assessing credit risk increases. This results in a loss of efficiency through over or undercompensation of these credit risks. Increasing the certainty in this area will enable lenders to evaluate
better the risks inherently brought forth with lender liability.
292. The potential for lender liability most often arises when a creditor has leverage against
the debtor. With leverage comes the power to control the debtor. This is best exemplified by
the position assumed by a senior secured creditor. Analyzing the role of a senior secured creditor
will create a better understanding of the typical position a lender is in.
293. See Scott, supra note 21. In his article, Scott reviews the theories proposed to justify
secured credit and the influential position enjoyed by the senior secured party. Initially, secured
credit was justified on the premises that secured credit made credit available to high risk debtors
who otherwise would not be able to obtain credit. Id. at 901-02. This theory, however, has been
undermined with the development of modern finance theory. Id. at 902. The problem is that
the benefits to secured creditors are offset by the increased costs to unsecured creditors who
suffer from the reduction in assets available upon the debtor's default. Id. This has been labeled
a zero sum game since the benefits to the secured creditor are achieved at the expense of the
unsecured creditors. Id. (citing Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A
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often provide sophisticated financial management otherwise unavailable to the debtors.2 4 Further, by extensively monitoring the debtors,
senior creditors generate external benefits recognized as a "public
good."2s
Most importantly, a senior creditor's broad based monitoring releases other creditors from the monitoring task, preventing a duplication of effort.w This reduces the more junior creditors' monitoring
costs.

97

In essence, the junior creditors "free ride" on the senior cred-

itor's monitoring expertise. 2w Hence, the senior creditor provides
broad monitoring and input which are valuable services benefiting all
participants with a stake in the debtor's enterprise. 9 Lender liability
should not be expanded to deprive other creditors of this useful service.
The impending threat of the debtor's insolvency disrupts cooperation and increases tension3 °° In addition, the market and reputational
constraints on the borrower break down, increasing the borrower's
incentive to engage in high risk or wrongful conduct to salvage operations 01 Typically, the senior creditor is encouraged to step in not
302
only to help the debtor, but to provide valuable monitoring.
Everyone wins if the debtor's business is saved. If the senior creditor's
efforts prove unsuccessful, junior creditors and the debtor view the
senior creditor as the deep pocket against whom losses may be mitigated. In the scramble to salvage the debtor, distinguishing lender
misconduct from legitimate efforts to protect the lender's interests
becomes difficult. Realizing the benefits accruing from lender control
will enable a more responsible judicial response to control abuses. The
judiciary must develop workable guidelines so lenders are not discouraged from helping a debtor facing financial difficulties.

Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10-11, 18-21 (1981)). Scott justifies secured
credit through the monitoring expertise provided by the senior secured creditor. Id. at 902-03.
See also Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE
L.J. 49 (1982).
294. Scott, supra note 21, at 931.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 902, 931.
298. Id. at 902, 931-32; see also Levmore, supra note 21, at 53-54 (discussing the problems

of free-riding).
299. Scott, supra note 21, at 931.
300. D. ROME, supra note 23, 8.01, at 8-2 to 8-3.
301. Scott, supra note 21, at 924. Scott points out that as long as business remains good,
the need to maintain a market reputation and goodwill constrains a debtor's misconduct. However, as the debtor's business deteriorates, he has less to risk and more to gain from misconduct.

Id.
302.

Id. at 919-22.
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Fairness mandates equal treatment of both the lender and borrower. A good faith obligation imposed on a lender should also be
accompanied by a corresponding obligation on the borrower. For instance, courts often impose a good faith obligation requiring the lender
to continue advancing funds until the borrower has the opportunity
to seek alternative financing. °a Such an incentive encourages the borrower to use these funds in a high risk fashion to save the failing
business."" Thus, a corresponding obligation of good faith should be
35
imposed on the borrower to deter misuse of those funds.

1

Responsible judicial action enhanced by an awareness of how the
credit market operates can help define the scope of lender liability.
Senior creditor's valuable monitoring expertise should be preserved
with the obligation of fair dealing imposed on both parties. Courts
should balance the borrower's need for protection from arbitrary lender
conduct against the creditor's need to take quick action upon default.3 6
However, efforts to confine lender liability within reasonable bounds
cannot rest solely with the judiciary. Lenders must also take action
to establish respectable standards of conduct for their industry.
V.

IMPACT OF LIABILITY ON LENDER CONDUCT

The doctrine of lender liability sends a signal to the banking industry that lending philosophies and practices must be altered. Lenders
must sacrifice self-righteousness and arrogance if they want to control
their destiny in the courtroom3 7 In surveying the cases in this area,
a few guidelines can be set forth.
Most importantly, good faith should become a standard practice. 3°s
Borrowers should be treated reasonably and fairly °9 Personality conflicts should be addressed immediately and lenders should always strive

303. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 221-24.
304. Scott, supra note 293, at 919-22.
305. See Flick & Replansky, supra note 10, at 228 (authors point out that the K.M.C. court
left open the question of whether a corresponding obligation of good faith would be imposed on
the borrower).
306. A need for the creditor to act quickly is illustrated by a situation where a creditor
holds a security interest in inventory and discovers the debtor is selling out of trust. A debtor
sells out of trust when selling inventory without reinvesting the proceeds in other inventory or
transferring the proceeds to the creditor as stipulated in the financing agreement. For a case
in which the borrower's interests outweighed those of the lender's, see Skeels v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
307.

Cappello, Banking Malpractice?, CASE & COM. Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 3, 6.

308.
309.

Id. at 7.
Id.
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to conduct themselves in a professional manner1 0 While courts recognize a distinction between duress and a lender's hard negotiating position,311 the lender should never imply a loan will be called if certain
events occur, unless a lender has decided to take specific action.312

A full committee should review the decision to call a loan in default
or terminate a credit line 313 Although demand notes permit a lender
to call the loan for any reason, lenders should nevertheless ensure
legitimate business reasons exist which justify the calling. 314 Similarly,
a lender should take care to justify exercising rights under a nonmonetary default clause. Lenders should not exercise these rights in an
offensive manner. Generally, the lender must believe the borrower's

ability to pay is impaired and substantiate this belief by showing a
substantial change in the borrower's position.3 15 If the default involves
collateral and the loan appears fully secured, before repossessing, the

lender must justify its belief the collateral is impaired.3 16 The best
preventative measure against liability is to notify the borrower before
any action is taken on the loan.317
The loan agreement often plays a central role in determining liability-3ls Clauses conferring control to the lender should be avoided. For

instance, a lender should not include clauses permitting it to make
management decisions or control day-to-day operations.319 If stock se-

310. Personality conflicts are especially dangerous when lenders face assertions of breach
of good faith. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
jury may have concluded that [the lender] abused his discretion in refusing without notice to
advance funds despite knowing he was fully secured because of his disapproval of [the debtor's]
management philosophy."). Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d
193 (7th Cir. 1983); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
311. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, 606 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
312. Such a statement will be viewed by a court as a threat. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). A threat need not be wrongful. In the ordinary
course of business, a secured creditor may have grounds to threaten to foreclose upon a defaulting
debtor. Id. at 685.
313. See Swartz, supra note 2, at 22.
314. Cf. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying the obligation
of good faith to demand notes).
315. See Brown v. Avemco, 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
316. See Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983).
317. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Alaska Statebank
v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232
(Minn. 1980).
318. See, e.g., Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 689 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
319. Moss, supra note 16, at 72.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss1/5

40

Cassedy: The Doctrine of Lender Liability
DOCTRINE OF LENDER LIABILITY

cures the loan, the agreement should provide that the lender receives
no voting right until default."' To avoid liability under RICO, the
lender should carefully draft the loan's interest rate, including a precise
method of calculating the prime rate. 21 Further, the lender should
make no oral representations concerning the enforcement of any provision."' Most important, the loan should correctly reflect the lender's
regular practices and the parties' true understanding. 2 3
While Farahinfers that management clauses are impermissible,"'
authority suggests that properly drafted management clauses which
balance the rights of both the lender and borrower are permissible."'
However, because control liability may arise under such a clause,
parties should carefully evaluate the use of these clauses."' The lender
should include a management clause only if the lender feels it would
not otherwise lend.3- If the lender finds a management clause is necessary, the preferred individuals should be specifically named.'2 Finally,
in exercising rights under a management clause, the lender may
suggest several candidates, but should never choose the individuals.'
A lender should not excessively pressure the board of directors.
The lender should not send a representative to board meetings, or
participate in board member selection."' Interlocking directorships
will give the appearance of impropriety and lenders should avoid them
entirely.31

Further, lenders should be especially careful to maintain good
files." 2 All employees should be informed that a jury may ultimately

320. See Flick & Replansky, supranote 10, at 241. In the BUSINESS WORKOUTS MANUAL,
Rome suggests that stock should not be taken as security since the creditor already has priority
over shareholders as to access to corporate assets. D. RoME, supra note 23, 8.03[31[c], at 8-10.
321. See Flick & Replansky, supra note 10, at 225.
322. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). See also supra note
214 (parol evidence rule may bar statement made by bank representative where constitutional
rights or fraud are not involved).
323. This will prevent liability where a course of conduct which varies from the express
loan provision is found to have modified the loan agreement. Merely complying with the loan
provisions will not prevent liability. See Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 86-104.
325. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 679 F.2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Ludwig
Honold Mfg. Co., 46 Bankr. 125 (Bankr. Pa. 1985).
326. See Flick & Replansky, supra note 10, at 236.
327. Id.
328. See id.; see also D. ROME, supra note 23, 8.03, at 8-12 to 8-13.
329. D. ROME, supra note 23, 8.03, at 8-12 to 8-13.
330. Id. at 8-10 to 8-11.
331. See id. at 8-11 to 8-12.
332. Cappello, supra note 307, at 7.
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read any filed materials.m Lenders should maintain careful records of
all defaults under a loan.3 If a lender decides to take action on a
default, it should be put in writing and become part of the borrower's
file.m Finally, the lender should include complete records of all conver6
sations with the borrower in the file.3

Overall, the lender must listen and be sensitive to the borrower's
interests. When problems arise, the lender should make strong efforts
to resolve them. 7 Both the lender and borrower have an interest in
securing the borrower's business. In a workout, the borrower should
be primarily responsible for structuring the plan. Such responsibility
ensures the borrower's management team is committed to and enthusiastic about the plan. s Since problems often arise due to tension
between the lender and borrower, a free exchange of ideas will prove
beneficial to all.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of lender liability is permeating the banking industry.
Bankers must adapt their lending practices and become more sensitive
to the borrower's interests or face the price of liability. The lender
liability theories vary regarding the degree of control required to
impose liability.30 The historical development and consequences associated with the various lender liability theories justifies these varying standards.341
Liability for the mere potential to exercise control, however, runs
contrary to the underlying rationale justifying control liability.3
Courts generally impose control liability because exerting such control
conveys some benefit to the dominant party.m Without the actual
exercise of control, the dominant party receives no benefit justifying

333. Id.
334. See Flick & Replansky, supra note 10, at 227.
335. See id. at 236.
336. Moss, supra note 16, at 72.
337. D. ROME, supra note 23, at 8.07.
338. Id. 9.01[4].
339. See id. For more information, refer to list of sources in Swartz, supra note 2, at 27.
See also H. CHAITMAN, REPRESENTING THE LENDER IN LITIGATION (Practicing Law Inst.
May-June 1986); Carter & Morgan, Keeping Lenders From Breaking Boundaries That Lead to
Liability, 3 BANKR. STRATEGIST 3 (1986) (cited in Tyler, supra note 1, at 446 n.138)..
340. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 129-86.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
343. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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liability. Hence, courts should not impose liability for unexercised loan
provisions which only appear to confer control.
In applying the fiduciary obligation to the lender-borrower relationship, courts should employ a stringent standard commensurate with
the harsh penalties accompanying such an obligation.3 4 A standard
requiring complete domination to the extent the borrower maintains
no separate interests removes some practical problems inherent in
imposing a fiduciary duty on a lender.A5
The concepts of excessive control, duress, fraud, and good faith
are well-suited to curb lender misconduct. Lenders, like other professionals, should be responsible for their misconduct. However, in applying these theories, courts should be aware of how the credit markets
operate and recognize the valuable service senior creditor's monitoring
expertise provides. Courts should not allow lender liability to reach
a level where lenders are discouraged from helping a debtor in financial
difficulties. However, in all transactions, lenders must make good faith
a standard practice and encourage a free exchange of ideas. Everyone
wins if a workout proves successful and the debtor again becomes
profitable.
Melissa Cassedy

344.
345.

See supra text accompanying notes 152-66.
See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
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